1. Introduction

1.1 CONTEST is the United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism and its aim is to reduce the risk from terrorism to the UK, it’s citizens and interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

• Challenging the spread of terrorist ideology
• Supporting vulnerable people from being radicalised and drawn into terrorism
• Working with key institutions where there are risks of radicalisation

1.2 The CONTEST framework has four key strands:

• PREVENT – work to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
• PURSUE – reducing the threat by working to pursue terrorists to disrupt their plots
• PROTECT – reducing our vulnerability by working to protect against a terrorist attack
• PREPARE –mitigating the impact of a terrorist attack

 

2. Prevent

2.1 This document specifically focuses on the Prevent strand of the CONTEST framework.

2.2 The aim of Prevent is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Prevent work also extends to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism.

2.3 The objectives of Prevent are:

• Tackling the ideological causes of terrorism
• Intervening early to support people susceptible to radicalisation
• Enabling people who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate

2.4 The Prevent duty requires specified agencies such as education, health, local authorities, police and criminal justice organisations (prisons and probation) to help prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

2.5 When carrying out the Prevent duty, all agencies should ensure that they comply with other legal obligations, particularly those under the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Equality Act 2010. Further education and higher education settings should be especially mindful of duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom.

2.6 To tackle the ideological causes of terrorism, Prevent focuses on reducing the influence of radicalisers on susceptible audiences, as well as reducing the availability of, and access to, terrorist content.

2.7 Prevent intervenes early by identifying people who are susceptible to radicalisation and providing support to those suitable for intervention. Where the police assess a radicalisation risk following a Prevent referral, a Channel panel will meet to discuss the referral, assess the risk and decide whether the person should be accepted into Channel. Once accepted, the panel agree a tailored package of support to be offered to the person. The panel is chaired by the local authority and attended by multi-agency partners such as police, education professionals, health services, housing and social services. Channel is a voluntary process, and people must give their consent before they receive support. In respect of children who are accepted by Channel, consent is provided by a parent, guardian or the local authority if they share parental responsibility. Where risks cannot be managed in Channel, they will be kept under review by the police.

2.8 Rehabilitation seeks to reduce the risk of people who have been involved in terrorist-related activity, including those who have been convicted of offences. The Desistence and Disengagement Programme provides specialist Home Office-approved intervention providers to give support in the form of theological. Ideological and practical mentoring to reduce the offending risk.

3. Threat and risk

3.1 Prevent deals with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. Prevent’s first objective is to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism. The ideological component of terrorism is what sets it apart from other acts of serious violence. Islamist ideology is resilient and enduring. Extreme Right-Wing ideology is resurgent. Other ideologies are less present, but still have the potential to motivate, inspire and be used to justify terrorism.

3.2 In the UK, the primary domestic terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorism is the threat or use of violence as a means to establish a strict interpretation of an Islamic society. For some this is a political ideology which envisions, for example, the creation of a global Islamic caliphate based on strict implementation of shari’ah law, drawing on political and religious ideas developed in the 20th century by Sayyid Qutb and Abdallah Azzam. Many adherents believe that violence (or ‘jihad’ as they conceive it) is not only a necessary strategic tool to achieve their aims, but an individual’s religious duty.

3.3 Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism describes those involved in Extreme Right-Wing activity who use terrorist violence to further their ideology. These ideologies can be broadly characterised as Cultural Nationalism, White Nationalism and White Supremacism. Individuals and groups may subscribe to ideological trends and ideas from more than one category. Unlike Islamist terrorist groups, Extreme Right-Wing terrorists are not typically organised into formal groups with leadership hierarchies and territorial ambitions, but informal online communities which facilitate international links.

3.4 Prevent also tackles other ideologies and concerns that may pose a terrorist threat. Established terrorist narratives exhibit common themes such as antisemitism, misogyny, anti-establishment, anti-LGBT grievances and religious or ethnic superiority. Left-Wing, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism currently represents a significantly smaller terrorist threat to the UK than Islamist terrorism or Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism and is not currently present in the UK at any significant scale (although there has been some activity that has met a terrorism threshold in recent years). The majority of related activity in the UK has consisted of lawful protest, and where these have involved violence, it has resulted in offences relating to public order.

3.5 Conspiracy theories can act as gateways to radicalised thinking and sometimes violence. In some cases, a blurring of ideologies with personal narratives makes it harder to assess the risk that people may pose. The need to understand motivation and intent is why in some cases it can take time for an incident to be declared terrorism or not, and why sometimes it remains unclear.

3.6 Counter-terrorism efforts encounter a range of personal and ideological motivations to violence, where a traditional terrorist narrative may only be part of a much more complex picture. Terrorists can hold a range of personal grievances alongside the primary ideology for committing an attack. Individuals are increasingly adopting a mix of ideas from different ideologies into their grievance narratives. This contributes to the increasing challenge of assessing the motivation behind an individual’s violence, determining the most appropriate mitigations to put in place and judging whether or not that violence constitutes an act of terrorism. It is possible that violent adherents to movements and subcultures, such as Involuntary Celibacy (Incels), could meet the threshold of terrorist intent or action, should the threat or use of serious violence be used to influence the government or intimidate the public.

3.7 Prevent work should always be aware of the risk presented by the people or group in question and recognise the agency of people in aligning with extremist groups. Encouraging susceptible people to commit acts of terrorism on their own initiative is a deliberate strategy of terrorist groups in their propaganda and is exacerbated by communities who glorify acts of violence against society or specific groups within it.

3.8 There is rapid proliferation of terrorist content on multiple online services. Research has demonstrated that the internet has become the ‘preferred’ avenue for those searching for terrorist propaganda or contacts. The internet continues to make it simpler for individuals and groups to promote and to consume radicalising content. Government analysis of the Terrorism Act (TACT) offenders and TACT-related offenders’ radicalisation pathways in England and Wales found that online radicalisation had become the predominant pathway for an increasing proportion of TACT offenders. Previously, it had been a hybrid pathway, involving both online and offline influences.  This can involve people, including a concerning number of children under the age of 18, committing offences by downloading and disseminating terrorist materials.

4. Responding to the threat

4.1 Any decisions taken should be proportionate to the risk of terrorism and radicalisation in the local area, sector or institution. Local delivery should be tailored to reflect and respond to local threats.

4.2 For practitioners, it is key that, when carrying out functions under the Prevent duty, they are mindful of the need for proportionality. A risk-based approach should always be followed, using professional judgement and curiosity. There should be one consistent and proportionate threshold applied to Prevent activity across all extremist ideologies and radicalisation concerns. Where frontline professionals have identified a concern that they consider requires a referral into Prevent, it is important that they can indicate why this risk is relevant to Prevent. As Prevent is a counter-terrorism capability, the presence, or possible presence, of any terrorist or terrorism-linked ideology will be an important consideration.

5. Susceptibility to radicalisation

5.1 Radicalisation is the process of a person legitimising support for, or use of, terrorist violence. Most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause.

5.2 There is no single profile of a radicalised person, nor is there a single pathway or ‘conveyor belt’ to being radicalised. There are many factors which can, either alone or combined, lead someone to subscribe to terrorist or terrorism-supporting ideology. These factors often include exposure to radicalising influences, real and perceived grievances – often created or exacerbated through grievance narratives espoused by extremists – and a person’s own susceptibility.

5.3 A person’s susceptibility to radicalisation may be linked to their vulnerability. A person can be vulnerable if they need special care, support or protection because of age, disability, risk of abuse or neglect. A person’s vulnerabilities may be relevant to their susceptibility to radicalisation and to the early intervention approach that is required to divert them away from radicalisation.

5.4 In other cases, vulnerabilities may not be present or relevant to the early intervention approach required. Not all people susceptible to radicalisation will be vulnerable, and there are other circumstances, needs or other underlying factors that may make a person susceptible to radicalisation but do not constitute a vulnerability.

6. Early intervention: referral to Prevent

 

Referral

6.1 Prevent referrals are likely to be made in the first instance by people who come into contact with those who appear to be at risk of being radicalised. There is no single model of a person’s radicalisation journey or single profile of a radicalised person. Frontline professionals, when deciding whether to make a referral, should consider whether they believe the person they are concerned about may be on a pathway that could lead to terrorism.

6.2 Signs that extremist views are being adopted, including changes in behaviour that might signal a concern, can be used to consider whether a referral should be made to seek support under Prevent. In determining whether a concern meets the threshold for referral to Prevent, it is important to consider the harm posed to the person, as well as whether accessing support through Prevent might stop potential wider societal harm committed by the person.

6.3 The notice, check, share procedure should be applied.

6.4 Any concern should be escalated to the organisation or institution’s Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) or Prevent lead to check. If there is a concern about potential radicalisation or a reason to believe that someone is at risk of becoming involved in terrorism or supporting it, a referral should be made to police, who will assess whether the person is suitable to be considered by a Channel panel for support.

6.5 Anyone making a referral should ensure there is concern that someone may be susceptible to becoming involved in terrorism or supporting it. There may be times when the precise ideological driver is not clear. Yet, like any safeguarding mechanism, it is far better to receive referrals which turn out not to be of concern than for someone who genuinely needs support to be missed.

6.6 Providing feedback on referrals is not always possible to protect the confidentiality of the person referred once received by police.

6.7 If you are unsure whether a concern constitutes a Prevent referral, we encourage seeking advice from your DSL (or equivalent), local authority Prevent lead or police, in the first instance. Consideration should also be given to whether the person may be susceptible to radicalisation or may instead be more suitable for a different type of support or safeguarding referral.

6.8 The Prevent referral form is an online form which can be found on Cleveland Police’s Prevent webpage. The webpage provides some useful guidance and the ‘Make a referral’ button can be found at the bottom of the page.

6.9 Prevent referrals don’t require consent but any subsequent support can only be implemented with consent from a person with parental responsibility.

Gateway assessment

6.10 Once a referral is submitted to Prevent, it is assessed by specialist police officers and staff. These officers determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism and should therefore be considered by the Channel panel for support through Prevent. This is called a ‘gateway assessment’. If other support mechanisms are simultaneously required or being considered, these should proceed unless there is a good reason not to do so.

6.11 The police officers and staff who are assessing whether a referral should progress through to Channel will draw on robust decision-making frameworks to determine whether a referral meets the threshold for Prevent, and to ensure that a consistent threshold is applied. This includes, but is not limited to:

• determining the presence of an ideological driver
• determining what harm may be caused by the person (or could be caused to the person being referred)
• considering factors such as a person’s agency, as well as any predisposition to exploitation

Channel

6.12 The gateway assessment should determine the most appropriate forum to discuss the referral. Those who are appropriate for consideration at Channel are subject to a further, more detailed Prevent assessment led by the Channel case officer. This assessment is informed by information sharing with wider Channel partners.

6.13 Once the gateway assessment and multi-agency information gathering is complete, where appropriate, and where the Channel panel agrees, the person may be adopted into Channel and receive tailored support to reduce their susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism.

6.14 Channel panels are chaired by the local authority, and attended by multi-agency partners such as police, education professionals, health services, housing and social services. They will meet to discuss the referral, assess the risk, and, if appropriate, agree a tailored package of support to be offered to the person. Channel is a voluntary process, and the person must give their consent (or, where appropriate, their parent’s or guardian’s consent should be obtained) before they receive support.

6.15 Where Channel is not considered suitable, alternative options will be explored where appropriate. The person may be offered alternative support, such as by mental health services or children’s social care services. Where consent for Channel has not been given or the level of risk posed makes it unsuitable, the person can be considered for Police-led Partnerships. Police-led Partnerships cover the management of people, groups or institutions that are not suitable for Channel, but which have identified Prevent-relevant issues requiring support or mitigation. Police-led Partnerships are led by police but work in partnership with other agencies and employ many of the same type of approaches used within the multi-agency processes of Channel.

7. Local Authority Prevent Contacts

Cleveland Police Contacts
Prevent Team Telephone Cleveland Police on 01642 303397 / 301330 (PREVENT Team)
Prevent & Contest Team: fimunorth@ctpne.police.uk

Local Authority Prevent Contact Pages:
• Stockton Prevent
• Hartlepool Prevent
• Redcar & Cleveland Prevent
• Middlesbrough Prevent

8. Links to additional information and guidance

Cleveland Police: Prevent, including link to Prevent referral form
Cleveland Police: Prevent Referral Form
Prevent duty statutory guidance for England and Wales
Prevent duty e-learning: Learn how to support people susceptible to radicalisation
Channel duty guidance: Protecting people susceptible to radicalisation
Signs of radicalisation – what to look for – ACT Action Counters Terrorism
Get help for radicalisation concerns – Notice, Check, Share
CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023